April 1917
Place | Date | Hour | Summary of Events and Information | Remarks |
Bde. Hd. Qrs Dieval | 1. | Brigade in training | ||
2. | Brigade in training | |||
3. | Brigade in training | |||
4. | Brigade in training | |||
5. | Brigade in training | |||
Hermaville | 6. | 11th Brigade group plus 11th Field Ambulance & No 3 Coy 4th Divisional Train, marched to HAUTE AVESNES area. This move marked the commencement of the Brigade moving up to Battle. | See, Operation Order No: 80 | |
Hermaville | 7. | Brigade at rest in HAUTE AVESNES area. | Ref Map 1/100,000 Lens Sheet | |
Maroeuil | 8. | 11th Brigade moved to MAROEUIL – MAROEUIL WOOD area. The 526th Durham Field Coy R.E. Came under orders of the B.G.C., 11th Brigade at 7 p.m. | See Op. Order No 82. Ref Map 1/100,000 Lens, 1/20,000 51CNE France | |
Bde Hd Qrs in action | 9. | The following is an account of the operations from the 9th to the 16th inclusive. The 11th Infantry Brigade less the 11th Field Ambulance & No 3 Coy 4th Divisional Train left MAROEUIL at 5.30 a.m. For the Assembly areas preparatory to the attack. See 11th Brigade Instruction No 6 appendix C & D issued with Op order No 80. Ref Maps. 1/20,000 51C NW, 51C NE 1/10,000 ARRAS 51B NW3 1/10,000 FAMPOUX 51B NW4 Throughout the account of operations Map “A” issued with 11th Brigade Instructions No 2 attached to Op order No 79, should be perused. Zero hour for the attack was 5.30 am The Brigade was timed not to leave the assembly areas until zero plus 4 hours. (see appendix D accompanying 11th Brigade instructions No 6 & Time Table of Infantry Advances, appendix A issued with 11th Brigade Instructions No 2 of Op order No 79) Before going further into the Brigades movements it is necessary to explain briefly operations which were to take place by the 9th Division previous to the Brigade coming into action. The 9th Division front stretch from the river SCARPE to G.6.d.0.2 (ref: map ARRAS 51B NW3). From G.6.d.0.2 a straight line from LE POINT DU JOUR in H.3.b.2.2 marks the left boundary of this Division. The river SCARPE the right boundary. The 27th Brigade was on the left, the South African Brigade in the centre, the 26th Brigade on the right. The first objective of the 9th Division was the 1st German System of trenches termed The BLACK LINE. The 2nd objective the Railway Embankment termed The BLUE LINE. The third objective, The 3rd German System, a line roughly from the POINT DU JOUR to H.15.a.30, termed the BROWN LINE. The 4th Division was responsible for the capture of the 4th objective, a line from the POINT DU JOUR to H.12.a.4.0 to H.18.d.2.0 termed The GREEN LINE; this includes part of the 4th German System and the HYDERABAD REDOUBT, a distance of 6000 yards from the British Front Line and of 9½ miles about from MAROEUIL. The 4th Division followed the 9th Division, but attacked with 2 Brigades only. The 11th Brigade on the left, the 12th on the right, & the 10th in reserve. For Brigade boundaries, objectives & routes see Map “A” & 11th Brigade Instructions no 2 issued with Op order 79. The march of the Brigade from MAROEUIL to the Assembly Areas was carried out with incident. The 4th Division upon receiving news of the capture of the BLUE LINE, at 10 am ordered the 11th Brigade to move. The Brigade moved in column of route to the old British Front Line. The forward route was clear of artillery which had advanced previously & the fire of only one Gun had to be stopped. After passing the old British Front Line the Brigade advanced in two columns to the BLUE LINE, units moving in columns of route. Only very minor casualties were suffered and the BLUE LINE was reached in ½ an hour before schedule time. At schedule time (see table of Infantry Advances Appendix A issued with 11th Brigade instruction No 2.) the Brigade moved in artillery formations to assembly positions behind The BROWN LINE on 3rd German System. The advance was made on a compass bearing & units reached their positions without difficulty. This phase was marked by a practically complete absence of artillery fire by the enemy & battalions effected ant slight adjustments in their frontages that were necessary without any interference on part of the enemy. At 3.10 pm the leading battalions of the Brigade, 1/Somerset Light Infantry and 1/Hampshire Regiment, passed through the 9th Division and advanced in artillery formation until they came within view of the enemy within the 4th German System, when they deployed. The wire in front of this system was found to be untouched by our artillery fire and the only means of passing through it was by the gaps which had been left in it by the enemy. The enemy offered on the whole little resistance, though some rifle & machine gun fire is reported. All the Germans with few exceptions in the front line surrendered. Those in the support line fled Eastwards, many being shot down. Meanwhile the 1/East Lancashire Regt formed up a defensive flank facing North from the POINT DU JOUR to the left of the 1/Hampshire Regt. Some bombing was necessary in the trenches in the vicinity of the POINT DU JOUR before the line could be established here, while the gunners in the German Gun positions on the N.E. slope of the spur appear to have offered a far more determined resistance. The advance of the two assaulting battalions direction had been lost with the result that the brigade edged too much to the South and owing to the similarity of the ground & the roads passing through the 4th German System, the mistake was not realized till later, when it was rectified without any difficulty. The 1st Rifle Brigade crossed the BROWN LINE 25 minutes after the two assaulting battalions, on reaching the wire in front of the 4th German System, the gaps of which were under hostile artillery fire, some casualties were suffered, The sunken road appears to have been then as later the line of the hostile barrage and most casualties were sustained on this line. The wire in front of the HYDERABAD REDOUBT was uncut, but the German resistance was weak and the redoubt was captured. The 1/Rifle Brigade immediately pushed forward patrols but encountered heavy machine gun fire and after an attempt to dig in posts East of the redoubt and further casualties had been sustained it was determined to consolidate efforts on consolidating the redoubt. It is not quite certain what the troops of the enemy were who offered resistance at this point and who dug in on a line 600 or 700x East of the Redoubt. If they were the troops who had retired from the 4th German System, they had recovered very quickly from their disorganization. It is more probable that retiring troops were rallied by the fresh Enemy troops who arrived on the scene about this time. There reserves as also the enemy troops in their retreat from the 4th German System were subjected to very heavy rifle & machine gun fire by our troops & it is certain that very severe casualties were inflicted on them. The Rifle Brigade expended so much ammunition on this that they had to cease fire to keep a reserve of ammunition. The Machine Gun Company report that they inflicted severe casualties on a battalion of infantry advancing in extended order on the GAVRELLE – ROUEUX road. Before it was dark the enemy troops in this vicinity attempted a counter attack on the redoubt, this attack was completely stopped by our machine gun & rifle fire from the 1/Rifle Brigade and 1/Hampshire Regt., and many Enemy dead were seen lying on the ground East of the Redoubt. From this time onward the situation became quieter and consolidation was continued. During the day the estimated number of prisoners taken was 350 officers & other ranks of whom one was a General whose headquarters were in the SUNKEN ROAD. The number of Guns captured including those subsequently discovered was 26 of all calibres of which 4 were 8” howitzers. In addition 8 machine guns and one cooker besides a large amount of warlike material of all descriptions. The casualties of the Brigade were – (see 11th Brigade Casualty Report from 9th to 20th April 1917) | See 11th Brigade Instruction No 2 | |
10. | On the afternoon of the 10th inst under orders received from the Division the 1/Somerset L.I. & 1/Hampshire Regt sent out strong patrols to attempt to reach the line of the GAVRELLE – ROEUX road. They were met with a very heavy machine gun & rifle fire though their artillery fire was not so heavy. The two patrols of the 1/Somerset LI were unable to advance more that 100 or 200 yards and in a few minutes were practically all casualties, the platoons which were to advanced in support & make good the GAVERELLE-ROEUX road did not in consequence advance. In the evening of the 10th inst the enemy counter attacked the 1/Hampshire Regt who were occupying the 4th German System but did not push the attack home in the face of our artillery & machine gun barrage. This was probably a reconnaissance in force. The 1/Hampshire Regt sustained considerable losses from enemy artillery fire. Casualties - (see 11th Brigade Casualty Report 9th to 20th April 1917) | |||
11. | The Brigade was ordered to form a defensive flank facing North tp support ab attack by the 10th & 12th Brigade, whose objective was GREENLAND HILL and PLOUVAIN. The attack started at 12 noon and for sometime it seemed as if the right of the 10th Brigade might reach the GAVRELLE – ROEUX road. The attack however was held up by machine gun fire. The 1/Somerset LI who were detailed to form the defensive flank were unable to advance far and suffered heavy casualties from machine guns reported to N & NW of the Inn. | I.7.d.3.8 ref ARRAS 1/10,000 | ||
During the attack Cavalry patrols attempted to emerge from FAMPOUX; of those that were seen all became casualties within two or three minutes. | ||||
At 5 pm the 1/Hampshire Regt was ordered to bomb up the 4th German System as far as HONEY TRENCH. This operation was successful, though attended with considerable losses for so small an operation. In the evening of the 11th & night 11/12 yjr 1/East Lancashire Regt advanced their posts about 400 yds, thus pushing in front of several Guns that had been abandoned by the enemy. Casualties – (see list as before) | H.11.d ref ARRAS 1/10,000 | |||
12. | The attack which had failed on the previous day, was repeated by the 9th Division attacking while the 1st Rifle Brigade supported the left flank of the attack. In order to assist this operation the 1/Hampshire Regt was ordered to bomb up the 4th German System as far as H.6.a.4.1 if possible. This minor operation started at 1.30 pm but was unsuccessful mainly owing to rifle & machine gun fire. The main attack which was supported by a heavier artillery barrage than that of the 11th inst started at 5.30 pm, but was unsuccessful. The failure of the attack was again due to the enemy machine gun fire partly assisted by the fact that the 9th Division advanced in open order from the 4th German System (some 1000 yds behind our front line) and suffered very heavy casualties before zero hour, besides giving the enemy warning of the attack, The Rifle Brigade were caught by flank & frontal machine gun fire and did not advance more than 100 to 200 yds. In this short distance they suffered severe casualties 2 officers, 51 OR. Casualties, (see list as before) | ARRAS sheet 1/10,000 | ||
13. | No operation was carried out. During the night the enemy sent over a large number gas shells mainly on the battery positions of the 32nd Bde but a considerable number fell on EFFIE TRENCH in which the support Company of the 1st East Lancashire Regt was accommodated. Five gas casualties were sustained, but none were serious. Casualties (see list as before) | Communication trench from 3rd to 4th German system. | ||
14. | On the night of the 14th/15th the 1/East Lancashire Regt advanced their posts to a line approx: B.29.d.1.1 – H.5.b.3.7 – HONEY TRENCH, they were also instructed to reconnoitre & occupy the dug-outs in H.5.d.8.6. A report was received that these had been reconnoitred and found abandoned bu this was later found to be untrue. Casualties (see list as before) | FAMPOUX sheet 1/10,000 ARRAS sheet 51BNW3 1/10,000 | ||
15. | At 6.30 pm after a 3½ hours bombardment by heavy artillery the 1/Hampshire Regt attempted to work up the 4th German System as far as H.6.a.4.1 under cover of a creeping barrage of 4.5 hows. Advancing at a rate of 100 yds in 6 minutes. The attempt was unsuccessful, the men being unable to advance owing to rifle & machine gun fire from both flanks. Judging after the event it seems probable that the heavy artillery bombardment had been too long and that the trenches were so damaged that our own men in advancing had to expose themselves to enemy machine gun & rifle fire while moving over the damaged portions of the trench. Casualties – (see list as before) | |||
16. | The Brigade was relieved in the line of the night 16/17 & moved to the Railway Cutting (BLUE LINE) and the BLACK LINE. Judging the operation as a whole the following deductions may be drawn (1) It might have been possible by the immediate use of cavalry to exploit the success of the 9th inst. (2) Once the enemy had recovered from the effect of our rapid advance, by the assistance of fresh troops hurried to the stop the chance of converting the operation into “Open Warfare” had gone. The chance had gone probably as early as dusk on the evening of the 9th inst and this was proved by the failure of patrols of the 1/Somerset LI & even more certainly by the failure of the attack of the 10th & 12th Brigades on the 11th inst. It would seem that once the enemy has recovered from the demoralisation of a rapid retreat and has time to get his machine guns into action, the only course to be adopted is to renew the artillery preparation. This takes time, as his machine guns & strong points must be located by careful reconnaissance and knocked out. (3) It is for all practical purposes impossible to cut wire with 60 pounders, without direct observation. The wire in front of the 3rd German System, in the condition in which it was, when our attacking troops reached it, would have held up the attack had there been any but demoralised troops behind it. The wire in front of the 4th German System and HYDERABAD REDOUBT was untouched. (4) In the three operations since the 9th carried out by this brigade, it has been the machine guns that have held up our men. The enemy's artillery barrage could not have done this. Our artillery should therefore be almost entirely concentrated on knocking out the enemies machine guns. | Relief by 10th Brigade | ||
BLUE LINE | 17. | The 11th Brigade Group less the 11th Field Ambulance & No 5 Coy Train moved with the reserve and was accommodated in dug-outs & trench shelters in the BLUE & BLACK LINE as follows. BLUE LINE Brigade H.Q. 1/East Lancashire Regt 1/Hampshire Regt 11th Machine Gun Coy 11th Trench Mortar Battery BLACK LINE 1/Somerset Light Infantry 1/Rifle Brigade | ||
BLUE LINE | 18. | The 11th Brigade was in reserve on the 17th. Orders were received from the 4th Division for the 11th Brigade to relieve the 12th Brigade in the old British Support line. In the evening the 1/East Lancashire Regt. moved back to the old British support line and took billets from the 2nd Essex Regt who moved up to the BLUE LINE. | See Op order No 83 | |
19. | The order for the 12th Brigade to relieve the 11th was cancelled & the 11th Brigade remained in the BLUE & BLACK LINES with the exception of the 1/East Lancashire Regt who had moved on the 18th. The 4th Division was ordered to hold itself in readiness to proceed out of the forward area on being relieved by the 37th Division. | |||
Agnes-Les-Duisans | 20. | The 11th Brigade was relieved by the 111th Brigade & received orders to proceed to AGNES-LES-DUISANS area. The 1st line transport & call personnel that were left behind with the transport at the beginning of operations rejoined their units. The 11th Brigade including the 11th Field Ambulance & No 3 Coy Train billeted in AGNES-LESA-DUISANS in the evening. Although the men had come straight out of the reserve line, there were only two or three cases of men falling out on the march which was about 8 miles. (See Op order No 84, Ref Map 1/100,000 Lens sheet) | Ref Map 1/100,000 Lens sheet | |
Bde Hd Qrs IZEL-LES-HAMEAU | 21. | Orders were received from the 4th Division for the 11th Brigade to proceed to IZEL-LES-HAMEAU area. The brigade group arrived in this area in the afternoon and billeted as follows. IZEL-LES-HAMEAU Brigade H.Q. 1/Somerset Light Infantry 1/East Lancashire Regt 1/Hampshire Regt VILLERS-SUR-SIMON 1/Rifle Brigade AMBRINES 11th Machine Gun Coy LES HAMEAU 11th Trench Mortar Battery | See Op order No 85. Ref Map 1/100,000 Lens sheet | |
22. | 11th Brigade Group at rest. | |||
23. | 11th Brigade Group at rest. | |||
24. | 11th Brigade Group training. | |||
25. | 11th Brigade Group training. | |||
26. | 11th Brigade Group training. | |||
27. | 11th Brigade in training. | |||
FREVIN-CAPELLE | 28. | Orders were received from 4th Division for the 11th Brigade to proceed to FREVIN-CAPELLE area. The move took place in the morning. Owing to the accommodation falling short of that slated in Oper. order No 86 units billeted in the following places. FREVIN-CAPELLE Brigade H.Q. 1/Hampshire Regt 526th Durham Field Coy R.E. CAPELLE-FERMONT 1/East Lancashire Regt Huts E.17.c central 1/Somerset Light Infantry 1/Rifle Brigade Huts E.17.a central 11th Machine Gun Coy 11th Trench Mortar Battery ACQ No 3 Coy Train Ref: Map 51C 1/40,000 | See Op order No 86 | |
Y HUTS | 29. | Orders were received from 4th Division for the 11th Brigade Group less the 11th Field Ambulance & No3 Coy Train to proceed to “Y HUTS”. This move was carried out in the morning. The weather was very warm & bright. “Y” Huts are situation on the main ARRAS – ST POL road, L1b & L2c. | Ref Map 1/40,000 FRANCE 51C | |
30. | Orders were received from the 4th Division for the 11th infantry Brigade to proceed to ARRAS and take over billets of the 10th Inf Brigade. The move was carried out during the day. The 10th & 12th Brigades moved up to take over the line from the 34th Division; the 11th Brigade was in reserve. The line being taken over by the 10th & 12th Brigades was roughly I.7 central, I.13 central, I.19 central. This marks the second entry of the 4th Division on to the front they captured & defended from April 9th 1917. | Ref Map 1/20,000 51BNW France |